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Homegrown terrorism; the known unknown

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Abstract

Homegrown terrorism has attracted significant attention following the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings. Homegrown terrorism is usually thought to be a new phenomenon, with few observed events, and inherently distinct from transnational terrorism or the old domestic terrorism in Europe. However, little research has so far examined the alleged distinctiveness of homegrown terrorism empirically. I argue that homegrown terrorism shares many similarities with domestic and international terrorism, suggesting that we can learn more about homegrown terrorism from studying these similarities rather than insisting on its inherent distinctiveness. I formulate these claims as testable hypotheses, which I examine using the ITERATE data on international and the TWEED on domestic terrorism, and compare these with information on homegrown terrorism. My findings suggest that homegrown terrorism follows the same logic of other types of domestic terrorisms, hence lessons can be learned through observations on domestic typologies. Homegrown terrorism is a separate strain of domestic terrorism due to ideological character of political Islam, yet differing from international terrorism in targeting patterns. The implications of the study are that counterterrorism efforts for homegrown terrorism should resemble those of domestic terrorism rather than international terrorism.

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1   Introduction

Prior to the Madrid train bombings, many journalists, scholars and policymakers already argued that the nature of terrorism was changing (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999). The changes were often attributed to rise of religious terrorism and transnationalization of the terrorist networks. A commonly accepted perception was that al-Qaeda had successfully spread the ideology of political Islam even in Western Europe and recruited foot soldiers to carry out attacks such as Madrid and London. This inherently suggests that homegrown terrorism has a strong international element to it and the subsequent counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan was intended to eradicate this internationalized phenomenon. However, many of perpetrators of homegrown terrorism were born and raised in the countries they attacked and lived seemingly 'normal' lives in their communities. This perhaps indicates that the lessons learned from international terrorism to counter homegrown terrorism can be misleading. To this end it is important to ask the question; is homegrown terrorism international or domestic terrorism? Due to having only nine observable cases of homegrown terrorism, it is impossible to use statistical methods to answer this puzzle. I argue that homegrown terrorism is by nature domestic terrorism and I demonstrate this by using a comparative approach. The comparison is done by looking at differences and similarities between the various types of terrorisms in Western Europe. This moreover enables us to learn more about homegrown terrorism by looking at other types of events that are similar to it.

Despite the growing concerns over the rise of religious terrorism mainly within the immigrant populations, surprisingly few studies either define the concept of homegrown terrorism. In their recently published article 'Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research', Young & Findley (2011) identify three main issues that overshadow the developments of terrorism research; definitions, undistinguished types of terrorisms and wrong units of analysis. Even though the number of articles published in terrorism has doubled after the 'spectacular' attacks on the World Trade Center, there are still many unfortunate and even misleading trends in this particular field of research. One of the problems that the authors pinpoint are definitional issues that subsequently lack empirical testing. This holds true particularly for homegrown terrorism. Some definitions do exist, but they are not tested empirically. In defense of the lack of empirical studies, there are very few observable data of this recent phenomenon and therefore any robust statistical analysis of causation is almost impossible. This paper will however addresses the issue by providing an operationalizable definition as well as using the small number of observations through comparison. Another pitfall addressed in this article is the lack of distinguishing between different types of terrorism. The purpose of this study is to learn more about homegrown terrorism through studying other types of terrorisms.

Since domestic terrorism is a much more frequent type of terrorism than international in Western Europe[1](See Figure 1), it is somewhat counterintuitive that Western

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[1]This has been pointed out by for example Engene (2004) and Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle (2009)

Figure 1: Number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe

European governments invest so much money and personnel in countering the threat of terrorism overseas. After the 9/11 attacks in New York, many Western European states were willing to join the war on terror declared by the Bush administration the following day. The former Prime Minister Gordon Brown confirmed the perception of the threat of international terrorism by declaring in his speech in November 2009 that al-Qaeda is the biggest threat to British security[2]. Some existing literature suggests that the likelihood of a country being targeted by international terrorist groups does not only depend on regime type, welfare policies, trade, population size, inequalities etc., but also on their international alliances and the strategic value of the foreign targets (Neumayer & Plümper, 2009; Plümper & Neumayer, 2010). This account goes some way in explaining why Western European governments invest money and military forces in fighting against terrorism abroad although the occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks in Western Europe is twice as frequent as international terrorist attacks. More profoundly this suggests that perhaps the confusion over what is international and what is domestic terrorism influences the decisions to allocate resources in countering terrorism[3]

Naturally frequency of attacks is not the only factor guiding counterterrorism decisions, but also the severity of attacks and the target types of both international and domestic terrorisms. Attacks with large civilian casualties are more likely to exert more pressure for the governments to act proactively in response. Severity and target types of international, domestic and homegrown terrorisms are analyzed as indicators of dif-

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[2]The Times, 16.11.2009, available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6918483.ece Last accessed 20/04/2011.

[3]The current Prime Minister David Cameron said in his speech at a security conference in Munich that: 'We have got to get to the root of the problem, and we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie.' Number 10, 5.2.2011, available at:http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/.

ferences or similarities in this article. I mainly use two datasets for the similarities and differences analysis; International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE)[4] and Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED)[5] through years 1968-2004.

The study focuses on eighteen Western European countries. The reason for this narrow focus is that even though homegrown terrorism is perceived as a problem in the Western states as a whole, the issue mainly stems from Muslim immigrant populations, which are the largest in Western Europe (Peach, 2007). Data on homegrown terrorism is compiled from academic sources (Bakker & Donker, 2006; Harrow, 2010), news reports, as well as from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)[6] . Unlike some other academic sources, I exclude foiled attacks and plots, since the information does not allow me to compare homegrown terrorism in relation to other types of domestic terrorisms in Western Europe. The data for the latter is not available. Including arrest data of individuals and foiled plots naturally increases the amount of observations. Harrow (2010) justifies this inclusion as it compensates for the increased counterterrorism measures. However, this is not very useful for comparisons, since counterterrorism measures are often heightened by the target government when the threat of terrorism is perceived high, whether this takes place in the form of legislative change or not. This is not an exception with regards to homegrown terrorism. Counterterrorism has also been argued to be counterproductive[7], which on the other hand means that more attacks could take place regardless of increased counterterrorism efforts. The collected cases for the actual attacks are very few (N=9) without the foiled incidents and two of these cases were failed attacks. Regardless of the fact that number of incidents is very low, researchers and policymakers should put emphasis in learning about homegrown terrorism merely due to the high number of injuries and killing generated just by a few attacks in Western Europe (see Figure 2 & 3).

This article consists of four sections. The first section introduces definitions of domestic, international and homegrown terrorism including a short literature review for each type. The second section outlines my theoretical framework followed by hypothesis about the logic of targeting. The research design and empirics are presented in chapter three and the final chapter provides some discussion on counterterrorism and suggestions for future research.

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[4]ITERATE dataset

[5]Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED), available at: http://folk.uib.no/sspje/tweed.htm Last accessed 20/04/2011

[6]Global Terrorism Database (GTD),available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ Last accessed: 20/04/2011

[7]Several scholars have studied the potential counter productiveness of proactive measures by governments in tackling terrorism as well as the positive influence of a spectacular attack on terrorist recruitment. See for example Bueno De Mesquita & Dickson (2007)

Figure 2: Number of injuries over time

Figure 3: Number of killings over time

2   Definitions

Terrorism is a contested concept. This means that every researcher in the field of terrorism has to always specify the definition of terrorism they use in order to make their criterion of inclusion or exclusion of events implicit. The use of variety of definitions in the literature makes it harder to trust the outcomes of different studies given that most of them utilize publicly available datasets, whose coding rules at best are very questionable. I demonstrate the issue of problematic definitions by looking at the widely used international terrorism dataset definition as well as the dataset for domestic terrorism. Given their definitions, many events in these datasets can be overlapping rather than mutually exclusive.

The international terrorism dataset (ITERATE) defines transnational (which I refer to as international) terrorism as: "intended to influence the attitudes and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when, through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its ramifications transcend national boundaries"[8]. This loose definition of international terrorism can code virtually all incidents of terrorism as international and therefore biases the distribution of domestic vs. international attacks. A good example of this is that the attacks by the IRA in mainland Britain are considered as international regardless of the phenomenon being a separatist struggle. The same attacks are of course also included in the domestic terrorism dataset, TWEED. TWEED dataset also uses a criterion in which a terrorist attack is based on the communicative nature of the violent act meaning that there are immediate victims through witch terrorists send a message to a larger audience. The coding rules state that any act where the actor originates from outside Western Europe or the act is imported does not constitute domestic terrorism[9]. It is however not clear what is meant by actors originating from outside Western Europe as for example in the case of homegrown terrorism, the actors often have either residency or citizenship in the countries they target regardless of being born or having family background for example in the Middle-Eastern countries. Also the notion of imported terrorism seems rather ambiguous. Even though the homegrown terrorists in Western Europe do not often have any established linked with for example al-Qaeda, it has often been suggested that the ideology of al-Qaeda has been an inspiration of the recruits in Western Europe. Does the imported terrorism also reflect imported ideologies according to the TWEED definition?

As previously noted, there is an increasing amount of literature about homegrown terrorism, but often without a clear definition of what this constitutes of. The definition has to be specific enough to be able to operationalize the concept and collect any, even if very limited, data on the phenomenon. Mullins (2010) identified some features, which are often related to the concept of homegrown terrorists; they were born and/or spent most of their lives in the West, lack direct foreign (non-Western) international support

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[8]ITERATE codebook, 2003 p.2
[9]TWEED codebook, 2006

or control, were radicalized within their Western home countries, trained and achieved attack-capability in their Western home countries and planned/carried out attacks in their Western home countries. The author, however, acknowledges that if these elements are put together, it would constitute such a strict criterion that hardly any organization would fit the category. Crone & Harrow (2011) embark on the same journey to reduce the ambiguity in the use of the term homegrown terrorism by breaking the concept down into two dimensions; belonging and autonomy of the West. Their article provides a useful fourfold categorization of the phenomena at hand and tests the typologies with data on 65 Islamist terrorist attacks and 228 individuals from 1989 to 2008. Only four events in their data took place in the West. Although the authors introduce an important discussion on the scope and meaning of the term homegrown terrorism, the article fails to address a vital issue of motivation. Regardless of the level of belonging and autonomy of the group, what determines the modus operandi of the group or an individual, is their aim. This article mirrors the argument of Engene (2004) suggesting that what constitutes domestic terrorism is depended on whether the perpetrator is trying to influence the legitimacy of the government in the target country. I also suggest that a definition needs to help in distinguishing one form of terrorism from another, namely homegrown from domestic or international. My definition of homegrown terrorism therefore is individuals, sub-state groups or organizations who hold a citizenship or residency in the country within which they perpetrate or intend to perpetrate acts of terrorism guided by the ideology of political Islam. Since by definition homegrown refers to internal individuals and groups, the ideological separation differentiates domestic typologies from one another.

2.1 Domestic, international and homegrown terrorism in the literature

Previous literature on terrorism is mainly dominated by studies of international terrorism. This has often been due to lack of data on domestic terrorism. It seems to be an explicitly acknowledged issue in the field of terrorism studies that we know so much about international terrorism, but so little of domestic terrorism (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle, 2009). Some recent literature, however, has tried to narrow this gap between international and domestic terrorism studies. Jan Oskar Engene collected data on domestic terrorism in Western Europe from 1950-2004 and compiled the TWEED dataset. In essence Engene also introduces a comparison between terrorisms in Western Europe and explains the variation of the frequency of terrorism between countries as an issue of legitimacy (Engene, 2004). Unfortunately due to the time frame of his study, homegrown terrorism does not feature as a category for comparison in his work and moreover it may be that the coding criteria would have excluded these few cases from his study regardless. In addition to his work a recent study by Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle (2009) introduce a new dataset on Domestic Terrorist Victims (DTV)[10] in Western Europe from 1965-2000. The authors also criticize the way in which domestic and in-

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[10]The Domestic Terrorist Victims dataset (Version 1), DTV, available at: http://www.march.es/ceacs/proyectos/dtv/datasets.asp Last accessed 16/6/2011

ternational terrorism are categorized. This categorization biases the studies of terrorism toward the international dimension as well as provides questionable theoretical grounds for assessing the target country characteristics and international terrorism. As a demonstration of this tendency some previous studies focus for example in welfare provision, regime type and other economic proxies of the target country.(Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; Blomberg *et al.*, 2004; Burgoon, 2006). Do terrorists assess these characteristics of the country they target or is target selection rather a function of specific goals and the constraints in capabilities? Given that domestic terrorism is more frequent and majority of terrorist organizations challenge the regime they are rooted in, studies should focus much more on domestic terrorism.

A growing body of literature in Islamist or jihadist terrorism has emerged in recent years. Initially the literature focused mainly on al-Qaeda and the threat of international jihadist groups to the West (Bergen *et al.*, 2001; Burke, 2004; Sageman, 2004; Roy, 2004). After the Madrid and London bombings, however, the literature shifted slightly towards Europe investigating recruitment and mobilization, structure of jihadist cells Neumann *et al.* (2007), radicalization processes (Precht, 2007) and the characteristics and circumstances of joining jihad in Europe (Bakker & Donker, 2006). Bakker studied individual level attributes of European jihadists in comparison to the global Salafi network studied by Sageman (2004). The author concludes that the European jihadists are in fact fairly different to the global Salafi studied in Sageman's sample. The significant differences manifested in the following categories; the European sample had higher average age of joining, they were single men, self-recruited in their home countries and part-time jihadists. The subgroup the European jihadists mainly resemble are the North African Arabs in Sageman's sample. This study moreover demonstrates the gap between the international dimension of Islamist terrorism and the local (European) version, which makes the use of the term homegrown suitable. A common conclusion in all of the studies in Islamist terrorism is that the individuals are heterogeneous; hence no common terrorist profile exists. Many articles conclude that more research is needed into recruitment, mechanisms of radicalization and active participation in violent acts of terrorism. Homegrown terrorism has not generated much comparative literature and it seems that the debate of old and new terrorism has fused the concepts of international Islamist terrorism and homegrown terrorism into one. I however argue that homegrown terrorism is more similar to the other types of domestic terrorisms in Western Europe rather than its international Salafi counterpart. One main reason for this is that it is rooted in the internal scope of the country, whose government is in most cases the target of its action.

As summarized in the existing debates on the terrorism literature, there are many different dimensions to similarities and differences between typologies of terrorism. The dimension of interest for this paper is to look at the target types of each typology. The reason for this focus is that target types can reveal information about the perpetrator groups even when their constraints and capabilities are taken into account. This mechanism is further explored in the following section.

3 Terrorist group target selection

Terrorism can be studied at many different levels as well as separate parts of a process. In this section I introduce the theoretical assumptions of the target selection of different types of terrorisms illustrated by some examples. The domestic terrorist groups are disaggregated along ideological lines, whereas international terrorism can only be observed in the data as one aggregate category.

This paper adopts a framework in which the defining element of terrorism is communication. Terrorist groups are distinct from other forms of political violence because the the target of violence is different to the intended audience. Engene (2004) suggests that violence by terrorists includes a political message, which is intended to various different groups in the society. The aim of the message is to influence bonds of allegiance and loyalty between the diverse groups in the society, either weakening or strengthening the bonds. One of these groups can be the state, the public or other distinct groups within the society, i.e. ethnic groups. Of course for different terrorist groups, the group that they want to maintain loyalty to and who they perceive as the enemy depends on the goals of the organization. Terrorist organizations therefore strategically choose their targets in order to signal the message to separate groups in the society. If an organization wants freedom to its ethnic homeland, the likely targets to signal opposition are the occupying forces, i.e. military and police. By doing this the group can simultaneously signal loyalty to their ethnic kin group. Target selection, however, is not just a function of goals translated to suitable targets. Terrorist organizations are constrained in their actions not only by their internal capabilities and resources, but also by external factors such as counterterrorism measures hardening their preferred targets.

Rational actor models account for the constraints that the terrorist organizations face when selecting their targets. They follow a utilitarian philosophy where individuals choose from a set of alternatives each with given benefits and costs the ones that would maximize their gain. At group level such utility can derive from shared goals, at least within a given organization (Dugan *et al.*, 2005). Every terrorist group has certain personnel, financial capacity, buildings, weapons and entrepreneurial skills, which all constitute a finite set of resources. On top of the resources terrorist organizations possess, they also have some level of for example public support and media attention, which in economic terms constitutes their basic commodities. The relative prices of the basic commodities and the value of the resources constitute the overall price of an attack. The value of resources can be operationalized as probability of apprehension, severity of the punishments, loss of group members via deaths, likelihood of infiltration and the resources used to plan and execute the attack. Certain attack types are more likely to render the group to be captured; for example a failed large scale attack can lead to captured terrorists and subsequently the security of the rest of the group might be threatened. Given the resources the terrorist organizations will choose activities so that the likelihood of achieving the shared goal is maximized. In order to make rational choices all the costs

and expected utilities must be weighted prior to an attack (Enders & Su, 2007).

Terrorism is a phenomenon of the margins and terrorists do not often identify with large segments of society. Those large segments of society are therefore considered to be the legitimate targets of their attacks. Of course terrorism like any other form of violence generates some unintended consequences, but regardless frequency of target types should imply terrorist groups' constituencies and their legitimate targets, i.e. who they do not identify with.

Based on the theoretical frame, the general hypothesis of terrorist group targeting is as follows; terrorist groups have specific constituencies and they do not attack their own constituents. The legitimate targets of terrorist groups are outside their constituencies and formed by the groups of the society that they do not identify with. From this I derive groups specific hypothesis.

3.1   Separatist terrorism

In general Western Europe has witnessed three major types of ideologically divided domestic terrorisms from 1968-2004. The most dominant form of has been separatist terrorism. The main separatist terrorist organizations in Western Europe from the late 60's were the IRA in the United Kingdom and ETA in Spain. Both of these organizations wanted independence for their ethnic homelands. Therefore for these groups the preferred targets are the forces of occupation, i.e. military and police personnel. Ethnic struggles would presumably take place within their ethnic region, but avoiding civilian casualties since the organizations need support from their ethnic kin group members. In other words as Engene (2004) suggested, the separatist organizations were trying to weaken the legitimacy of the occupying state, whilst tightening the links between the terrorist organization and their ethnic population. Based on the rational choices the separatist organizations make in communicating their aims, I hypothesize:

H1: *Separatist terrorist organizations attack military and police targets most frequently, avoiding civilian casualties in their own ethnic homelands*

3.2   Leftist terrorism

The second most frequent type of domestic terrorism strain in Western Europe has been leftist terrorism. Alexander & Pluchinsky (1992b) call the leftist terrorist organizations in Europe fighting communist organizations (FCOs), whose ideological source for the struggle is based on Marxist-Leninism with the aim to get the working class to rise up against the capitalist exploiters. The most prominent group in Western Europe was the RAF, formed in 1978 as a continuation of the Baader-Meinhof Group formed in 1968. The preconditions for the leftist terrorism were founded in the new generation of youth, who in several industrialized countries protested against their parent's generation and the fascist past (especially Nazism in Germany), the war in Vietnam (and anti-imperialism),

changes in the educational system, poor living conditions of the students and the lack of democracy[11]. Granted that the aim for the FCO's was to replace the status quo government with a communist one, they wanted to gain a large number of supporters, mainly from the working class masses. This would mean that the terrorist attacks were designed to weaken both the legitimacy of the government as well as the status of the capitalist entrepreneurs. From this I hypothesize that:

H2: *Leftist terrorist organizations attack corporations and government officials most frequently, avoiding civilian casualties*

3.3   Right wing terrorism

Right wing terrorism appeared in the European landscape initially as a response to the threat of communism although another simultaneous process of post-war immigration occurred in Europe in the 1960's and 1970's, increasing the multicultural environment. Right wing terrorist groups were in favor of maintaining the existing governments and sometimes the strategy involved carrying out attacks and blaming them on the leftist counterparts. This would moreover turn people against the leftist groups and boost the legitimacy of the government[12]. Some research on right wing terrorist groups does however suggest that the ultimate aim was to overthrown existing governments in order to replace them with fascists ones rather than supporting the status quo[13]. One example of right wing terrorist groups is Combat 18, a violent neo-Nazi group originally from the United Kingdom. The organization was formed in 1989 and since then has conducted several attacks on members of ethnic minorities, immigrants and leftists (Lowles, 2001). Once the Cold War was over and communism did not threaten the existing governments, the right wing terrorist groups shifted their focus solely on anti-immigrant nationalist agenda. Again, the anti-immigration attitudes hardly rose from the dust, but most likely the economic crisis fueled the perception of competition between the native population and the immigrants on the job market. The recent homegrown terrorist attacks have increased anti-immigrant sentiment, more specifically against Muslim immigrants. Given the nationalist aims and the racist tendencies of the right wing terrorist groups, I hypothesize the following in relation to right wing terrorism and their preferred target types:

H3: *Right wing terrorist organizations attack civilians most frequently rather than state apparatuses*

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[11] The Observer, 20.1.2008, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/20/1968theyearofrevolt.features Last accessed: 21/04/2011

[12] Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, 2008, 20th Century Right Wing Groups in Europe Prone to extremism or terrorism?, available at: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Rightwing terrorism.pdf Last accessed 21/04/2011

[13] The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Terrorist Organization Profiles for right wing reactionary groups, available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/features/TOPs.aspx Last accessed: 21/4/2011

3.4 International terrorism

International terrorism in contrast to domestic terrorism is intended to influence the policy of an external actor in relation to the country that the terrorist group originates from. As much as international terrorism may stem from domestic grievances, the domestic political actors are not the target of the pressure for political change. An example of the first incident of international terrorism is the case of hijacking of an Israeli airplane in 1968 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Hoffman, 2006)[14] Alexander & Pluchinsky (1992a) make a specific reference to international terrorism experienced in Europe as the Middle-Eastern spill over terrorism. Of course terrorism could spill over from other regions of the world to Western Europe, as it has done for example in the case of the Lockerbie bombing in 1989 where Libyan terrorists sought revenge for the U.S. foreign policy at the Gulf of Sidra by bombing an aircraft over Scottish airspace (Eland, 1998). Many international terrorist attacks in Western Europe have not been claimed by the terrorist organizations in the same manner as domestic terrorist attacks. Partially due to this lack of information on the perpetrators, it is also harder to exactly identify what the reasons for the attacks were. Some researchers however suggest that Western Europe has become the stage for the disputes between Middle-Eastern states and groups, their political and socio-economic grievances as well as their historical hostilities (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992a; Esposito & Voll, 1996; Anderson, 1997; Huband, 1998).

Four broader categories for goals in targeting Europe have been suggested by Alexander & Pluchinsky (1992a) as; i) intention of silencing or intimidating political dissidents in exile, ii) pressuring the target state to alter its actions and policies, iii) revenge against persons or states and iv) demanding the release of imprisoned comrades. These suggested goals combine both internal and international elements for what the authors call spill over terrorism. Of course having such a broad category for analysis as international terrorism is, it is harder to find a general ideology or motive in explaining the occurrence. It can be however argued that the motivations to target foreign countries have less to do with the internal situation of the target country than the country of origins of the perpetrators. Some foreign policy decisions from the target countries and political alliances that have worsened the situation in the country of origins are more likely to have an impact on the target of the international terrorist groups. As also exemplified in the case of the highjacking of the Israeli airplane, the reason to operate away from the terrorists' home region was to attract international attention. The mechanisms of influencing the legitimacy of a government can be observed for international terrorism as well. By targeting the civilian population in for example Western European states, the target country's government can lose legitimacy by not being able to protect its citizens

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[14]The terrorists boarded the plane in Rome and diverted the plane into Algiers where they kept some passengers as a hostage whilst negotiating with the Israeli government. This event is a watershed episode marking the beginning of international terrorism, since it was the first time that the PLO took their struggle outside their region in order to bring international attention to their cause. One of the claims made by the PLO was to exchange imprisoned Palestinian comrades for the Israeli hostages. Time, 21.9. 1970, World: Drama of the Desert: The Week of the Hostages, available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,942267-1,00.html Last accessed: 21/04/2011

or by implementing policies that are viewed as causal factors for the attacks. This can moreover apply pressure for the target government to alter the policies directed at the perpetrators country of origin. They try to achieve this pressure by influencing the legitimacy and this most likely will be best achieved by causing large civilian casualties. Since the group that the terrorist organization wants to show their loyalty to has most likely nothing to do with the target population, they can attack indiscriminately. Indiscriminate attacking is also presumably logistically easier than targeting protected public persons. From this I hypothesize:

H4: *International terrorist groups attack civilian population most frequently rather than foreign state apparatuses*

3.5 Homegrown terrorism

The actual causes for homegrown terrorism unfortunately are still largely understudied and very few practitioners or scholars have devised empirical tests for these. Understandably for quantitative studies, the lack of testable event data on the dependent variable makes it hard to establish causality. Given that the young Muslims or converts are recruited from Western Europe, democratic welfare societies, explanations of abject poverty and injustices seem less relevant. Franz (2007) suggests that Europe has failed to integrate its Muslim immigrant population leading to self seclusion by the communities. This trend according to Franz is due to the socioeconomic and political conditions in terms of relative deprivation, identity formation and discrimination. Franz provides good theoretical and comparative approach into the Muslim disaffection in different European countries, but it does not provide systematic empirical evidence.

The ideological characteristic of homegrown terrorism stems from political Islam. Political Islam as a concept can be defined in various ways and has generated a lot of discussion in recent years[15]. In general political Islam refers to "...a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition." (Denoeux, 2002). It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a debate whether political Islam is inherently a violent ideology, but the interpretation of the ideology justifying violence is that of the homegrown terrorists. For the homegrown terrorists killing *Kuffar*[16] is their obligation and fulfilling jihad[17] is Allah's wish (Cole & Cole, 2009).

The ultimate goal of political Islam in the minds of homegrown terrorists is to establish the rule of Islam, hence the violent terrorist campaigns are intended to weaken the

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[15]For further discussion see for example Fuller (2002); Ayoob (2008)

[16]Kafir is a non-believer, plural Kuffar. The homegrown terrorists use this as a derogatory term, dehumanizing the non-Muslims to theologically justify killing them.

[17]Based on the interpretation of Qur'an, jihad can be either violent or peaceful. Homegrown terrorists perceive themselves as soldiers fighting a war against the enemies of Islam, hence violent jihad is acceptable.

legitimacy of the government. Moreover by attacking civilian population the government seems unable to protect its citizens and can be consequently perceived less legitimate. The justified targets according to the homegrown terrorists are all non-Muslims, hence civilian target types should be the preferred ones. Based on this I hypothesize:

H5: *Homegrown terrorist groups attack the civilian population most frequently rather than state apparatuses*

Even though right wing, homegrown and international terrorism are all hypothesized most likely to attack civilian population, one could expect that international terrorist groups are most likely to cause mass casualties than homegrown or right-wing terrorist groups. This is because for homegrown and right wing groups some of the individuals in their potential supporter pool is located in the same country where the attack takes place, they in theory should be more discriminate in order to avoid casualties of that constituency.

4 Empirics

The data on domestic terrorism are compiled from the TWEED dataset and on international terrorism from the ITERATE dataset. For the purpose of comparison, the TWEED dataset years are limited to 1968-2004 (instead of 1950-2004) to match those years covered in the ITERATE dataset. The ITERATE dataset is also limited in its coverage to those eighteen Western European countries covered in the TWEED dataset[18]. The TWEED dataset codes attacks also by the state agents, which for the purpose of this analysis are deleted. Similarly the ITERATE dataset codes killings of the actual perpetrators into the total amount of individuals killed, which were also deleted.

The data for homegrown terrorism are collected from academic sources (Bakker, 2008; Cole and Cole, 2009; Harrow, 2010), complemented with news reports as well as reported incidents from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).The overall amount of incidents is nine incidents dispersed through years 2001-2011. This of course suggests that this type of terrorism only came to existence in Western Europe after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. Out of the nine homegrown terrorist attacks in Western Europe, three (37.50%) took place in the UK, two in Germany and the one attack in each of the following countries; Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and France.

According to the theoretical framework, terrorist groups act rationally and choose their targets based on their capabilities and constraints with the aim of maximizing their utility in weakening or strengthening their bonds with a given group in the society (including the state). From this standpoint I derived five testable hypothesis about the likely

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[18]The countries covered are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

target types for four ideological types of domestic terrorisms and international terrorism. Table 1 shows the results for the target types of the four ideological types of domestic terrorisms and the frequencies in percentages.

Table 1: Target types of domestic terrorism by ideology

Target type	Ethnic/Separatist		Left wing		Right wing		Other		Missing	
Public	2,057	27.54%	132	16.82%	282	74.02%	8	15.09%	99	34.26%
Military and police	2,123	28.42%	130	16.56%	19	4.99%	7	13.21%	28	9.69%
Public services/admin	205	2.74%	78	9.94%	6	1.57%	15	28.30%	12	4.15%
Political institution	150	2.01%	74	9.43%	12	3.15%	3	5.66%	27	9.34%
Business	348	4.66%	149	18.98%	11	2.89%	8	15.09%	16	5.54%
Trade unions	1	0.01%	2	0.25%	3	0.79%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Other militants	102	1.37%	3	0.38%	3	0.79%	2	3.77%	1	0.35%
Other	78	1.04%	62	7.90%	6	1.57%	7	13.21%	7	2.42%

The table confirms the hypothesis that separatist terrorist groups attack military and police targets most frequently. The table however also shows that the frequency of civilian targets is very high. The potential explanation for the high number of civilian casualties could be firstly that once the separatist group moves their campaigns away from their ethnic homelands, civilians are not part of their constituencies in the mainland of the occupying forces and therefore they become legitimate targets[19]. Secondly, a substitution effect might take place once carrying out attacks against the preferred target types becomes too difficult. The substitution effect is likely to hold true for other types of terrorisms too. The hypothesis for left wing terrorist group target types is confirmed. The organizations attack business representatives or institutions most commonly. Right wing terrorists target civilians most frequently in 74.02% of the time.[20]

The collected nine cases of homegrown terrorism confirm the hypothesis of civilian targeting as 88.89% of the target types are civilians. With the aim of comparing the types of terrorisms, all types of domestic terrorism follow the logic of legitimate targets outside their own constituency translate into most frequent target types with the aim of influencing the bond of allegiance and animosity between different segments of the society. Table 2 summarizes the attacks.

Table 3. demonstrates the target types for international terrorism and the hypothesis of civilian casualties is not confirmed by the percentages of the target types. The most frequent target type for international terrorism in Western European countries is actually the target country's government officials and military. The second highest frequency is however civilians with 30.04% of the target types, which might be due to the unintended consequences or subsitution effect.

The unconfirmed hypothesis can be an indication that international terrorism does not, as a generic typology, follow the same logic of targeting as domestic terrorisms.

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[19]As evidence of this please see Eggen & Røislien (2010) on the logic of Palestinian terrorist groups targeting differently in the Occupied territories vs. in the state of Israel.

[20]The DTV dataset gives a slightly different result; nationalist (pro-secessionist) groups attack civilians most frequently, left-wing terrorists attack police most frequently and right-wing groups attack civilians most frequently.

Table 2: Homegrown terrorist attacks in Western Europe

Year	Country of attack	Killings	Injuries	Type of victim
2001	France	0	1	Civilian
2004	Spain	191	2050	Civilian
2004	Netherlands	1	2	Civilian
2005	UK	52	700	Civilian
2005	UK	0	1	Civilian
2005	Sweden	0	0	Civilian
2006	Germany	0	0	Civilian
2007	UK	1	5	Civilian
2011	Germany	4	4	Military and Civilian

Table 3: Type of immediate victims

Target types	Number	Per cent
Host government officials and military	186	5
Foreign government officials and military	1,143	31
Corporation officials	805	22
Prominent opinion leaders	124	3
Private parties, including tourists, missionaries, students	1,095	30
Indeterminate	292	8
Total	3,645	100

Perhaps, as (Alexander & Pluchinsky, 1992a) note, the motives for attacks could be revenge, demanding a release of imprisoned comrades, intention of silencing or intimidating political dissidents in exile and pressuring the target state to alter its actions and policies. It might be that the mechanisms to achieve these aims is not the same for that of influencing the bonds between different groups in the target society. It is also possible that international terrorist groups have an advantage from an element of surprise since domestic terrorist groups are under more scrutiny in the given country of attack. On the other hand the logistical implementation of an attack should be harder for international terrorist organizations. One can also speculate that the international terrorist groups have better resources and capabilities to attack government and military officials than the domestic terrorist groups. If however the strategic logic of targeting applies similarly to domestic terrorisms; the preferred target type should be civilian population, which should in principle be easier to conduct attacks against.

The article set out to analyze homegrown terrorism not as a distinct independent phenomenon, but either as part of international or domestic terrorism. Previous literature has been inconclusive in explaining which category homegrown terrorism belongs to. Even though the term has clear implications over the fact that homegrown is somewhat a domestic phenomenon, recent counterterrorism efforts by the Western European governments in the Middle-East suggest otherwise. Domestic terrorism is a function of decreased legitimacy in a country and domestic terrorist groups send messages of allegiance and animosity by using terrorist attacks as an instrument of pressure.

According to Engene (2004) legitimacy can be reduced down to three variables,

which help us to categorize Western European countries into groupings of more and less likely to experience domestic terrorism. These variables measure the ethnic heterogeneity of the country, continuity (operationalized as problems in the democratization process) and integration of the fringe groups in the society to the political arena. The most likely countries to experience terrorism are the ones that are ethnically heterogeneous, have problems of continuity and inclusiveness in the political system. By classifying the countries according to the values on these variables, France, Italy and Spain are most likely to experience terrorism domestically scoring positively in all the legitimacy problem categories. Table 4 illustrates the 18 Western European countries in relation to the three legitimacy measures as well as levels of domestic terrorism, homegrown terrorism and percentage of Muslim populations. Domestic and homegrown terrorism provide many parallels in this analysis. Firstly, homegrown terrorism has taken place in six separate Western European countries (United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden). Of these six countries alongside with Italy UK, France, Spain and Germany have experienced the most frequent domestic terrorism. According to Engene (2004) data, three out of the six countries with a homegrown terrorist event are ethnically heterogeneous. The measure used to capture this is very arbitrary and coded such that when a country's dominant group constitutes 96% of the population, a country is ethnically homogeneous. Ethnic heterogeneity in turn influences the likelihood of terrorism through potential cultural and social discrimination. Whilst it is perfectly sensible to assume that social and political discrimination can lead to higher risk of terrorism, the size of the ethnic minority might not be in any ways correlated to the occurence of terrorism. Even small minorities can use terrorism as a weapon, moreover the conventional wisdom suggests exactly terrorism to be the weapon of the weak. The more apprpriate measure would be to look which countries for example have minorities at risk and use that as a predictor of more likely occurences of domestic terrorism. Another parallel observed in Table 4 is that France, Netherlands and Germany are in the top five countries with most Muslim immigrants in Western Europe and have also experienced homegrown terrorism. The data on Muslim immigrants further casts a shadow over the reliability of the measure of ethnic homegeneity. Just by having over 4% of their population Muslim immigrants should give countires a score of *yes* in the problems of ethnic diversity categorization. This is not the case for Austria, Denmark, Germany and Netherlands.

Inherently, domestic terrorism is set out to change the conduct of domestic players, be it the government or other groups in the society. As an example the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany wanted to overthrow the fascist government and spread leftist ideology in Germany. Regardless of having widespread international attention and alleged alliances, the RAF was seeking political change in Germany. By attacking business targets in Germany, a message of animosity was sent to the capitalist exploiters, pressure was exerted to the government who could not protect its citizens, and a message of loyalty was projected to the masses, most importantly working class masses. This similar logic of terrorism as an instrument of communication can be observed in the nice cases

Table 4: Domestic and Homegrown terrorism in Western Europe

Country	Group	Continuity	Integration	Ethnicity	Domestic terrorism	% of Muslim immigrants	Homegrown terrorism
Austria	3	Yes	No	No	16	4.1	0
Belgium	5	No	No	Yes	52	3.9	0
Denmark	1	No	No	No	5	5.0	0
Finland	7	Yes	Yes	No	0	0.3	0
France	8	Yes	Yes	Yes	2801	6.7	1
Germany	4	Yes	Yes	No	296	4.2	2
Greece	4	Yes	Yes	No	248	1.3	0
Iceland	1	No	No	No	0	N/A	0
Ireland	3	Yes	No	No	26	N/A	0
Italy	8	Yes	Yes	Yes	351	1.4	0
Luxembourg	2	No	Yes	No	1	N/A	0
Netherlands	1	No	No	No	31	5.8	1
Norway	1	No	No	No	2	2.0	0
Portugal	4	Yes	Yes	No	204	N/A	0
Spain	8	Yes	Yes	Yes	855	1.2	1
Sweden	1	No	No	No	6	2.3	1
Swizerland	5	No	No	Yes	33	4.2	0
United Kingdom	5	No	No	Yes	4050	2.7	3

The data for Domestic terrorism and country categorization are from Engene (2004) and the percentages of Muslim immigrants per country from early to mid 2000's are from Peach (2007)

of homegrown terrorism. The groups are seeking for a pan-Islamist caliphate in their given countries and are often unhappy about the foreign policy choices of their government. These groups or individuals may feel a lack of integration, which has driven them to feel animosity towards the large segments of society. The target types of the nine attacks reflect this. By attacking the civilian population, pressure to the government is applied in order to change the political, economic or societal landscape of the country. Given that homegrown terrorism has the same logic of targeting as other domestic terrorisms, revealing the motivations and aims of the groups, we can apply lessons learned from domestic terrorism to homegrown terrorism. The next chapter provides explicit counterterrorism lessons to curb homegrown terrorism.

5   Discussion

One important aspect on learning about a particular type of terrorism is how to counter it. The problem is that misleading categorizations can lead to inaccurate counterterrorism recommendations. Jones & Libicki (2008) examine how terrorist groups end in their recent book, concluding that majority of terrorism actually ends in joining the political process (43%). The authors analyze 648 terrorist groups from 1968-2006 and find that inclusion to the political process in the terrorist groups' base country is the most frequent way for terrorism to end. The second most frequent way of terrorism to end is local police and intelligence work, but military force has rarely ended a terrorist campaign. Since this artcile established that homegrown terrorism indeed has many similarities with domestic terrorism, the phenomena should be countered using the methods that have worked for other types of domestic terrorisms. The feelings of exclusion in the societies should be addressed whereas military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to have an impact on homegrown terrorism in the West.

International terrorism cannot be countered by inclusiveness to the political process

as the attacks are often directed to influence the politics of another country, not the terrorist organizations home country. Military strategies alongside with intelligence work may be better in these instances than for domestic terrorism, but more studies need to investigate the responses to international terrorism and their effectiveness. Moreover, any lessons we may learn from domestic groups can be largely irrelevant to countering al-Qaeda. In their classic counterterrorism piece Enders *et al.* (1990) conclude that countering international terrorism in the U.S., the installation of metal detectors at the airports was the most successful policy. This on the other hand would unlikely help in preventing for example the London bombings. In order to counter the threat of terrorism, the disaggregation into different types of terrorisms has to be taken into account.

Since homegrown terrorism has only a few observations, this paper introduced a comparison of the logic of targeting, killings and injuries in relation to other types of domestic terrorism and international terrorism. This moreover enables us to identify whether homegrown terrorism indeed resembles international or domestic terrorism and draw lessons from one or the other. In order to do this the paper provided a operationalizable definition of homegrown terrorism and secondly used empirical evidence about the similarities and differences.

The empirical evidence shows that homegrown terrorism indeed resembles domestic terrorism in its logic of targeting. In order to study homegrown terrorism further, we should learn from other types of events that are similar; domestic terrorism. The counterterrorism lessons should also be drawn from other domestic terrorist groups and how their campaigns came to an end.

Even though it is beyond the scope of this paper to study the motivations of homegrown terrorism, it should be noted that there may be some universality in the motivations of domestic terrorisms. Most scholars of terrorism would duly reject the possibility of generalizing such a complex phenomena, but perhaps there is room for generalizability within the two main typologies; domestic and international. Again, we may know a lot about the roots of separatist, leftist and right wing terrorism, but we do not know enough about the roots of homegrown terrorism. And from a conflict resolution perspective, this would be the only way to solve the problem. Moreover, empirical research on the motivations for homegrown terrorism should be the next step in terrorism research.

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