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New incentives and old organizations: The production of violence after war

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New incentives and old organizations: The production of violence after war

Francesca Grandi, Yale University[1]

Abstract

The immediate aftermath of an armed conflict is a key window of opportunity to build sustainable peace and security. Whether and how violence arises during that time has profound effects on a country's political and economic development. Yet, defining and conceptualizing post-conflict violence has remained elusive. This paper contributes to a more comprehensive theory of post-conflict violence with a theory-grounded typology, which classifies different postwar violent scenarios and shows that specific logics drive different types of violence in different settings. The axes, on which I build this typology, are: strategic aims (predatory, constructive) and organization (directed, coordinated, spontaneous). This classification is the first step toward a more rigorous understanding of post-conflict violence. Post-conflict violence emerges as a combination of new political incentives and opportunities from the war legacy. The premise of this theoretical effort is that with a more solid grasp of the mechanisms driving post-conflict violence and its variation we can design more suitable policies to lower its incidence. Ultimately, this analytical framework can illuminate the growing practice of international interventions in post-conflict settings.

Introduction

Are violent societies a natural outcome of war? The troubled security situations of postwar Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Libya, Nepal, and South Sudan seem to suggest so. Violence, however, did not emerge in postwar Banda Aceh, Costa Rica, Croatia, Namibia, or Rwanda. Why do some societies relapse into violence while others do not? What explains this variation? Why does violence continue after a war's end? Under what conditions does it decrease or escalate? How does it intertwine with democratic consolidation? We lack exhaustive answers to these questions, despite the frequency of post-conflict violence, its centrality in hampering state-building and economic development, and the intensity of the human suffering it

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causes. This paper aims to fill this gap with a theory-grounded inquiry into the nature of post-conflict violence.[2]

The immediate aftermath of an armed conflict provides a key window of opportunity to build sustainable peace and security. Today, post-conflict peacebuilding is the major area of international intervention in the domestic affairs of third countries; continued violence at wars' end is its major source of failure. Yet, while the international community has devised increasingly sophisticated strategies to end wars, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of *why* and *where* violence emerges in post-conflict environments (Doyle at al. 1997; Otunnu & Doyle 1998; Snyder 2000; Stedman et al. 2002). This challenge is mostly due to that fact that defining and explaining post-conflict violence has remained elusive. The academic literature has not explored its causes and dynamics systematically. Its various forms have challenged comprehensive theory-building. As a result, the current practice lacks a coherent theoretical framework to guide its policies. Based on the idea that increased conceptual clarity would further our chances to address it appropriately, this paper contributes to a more systematic understanding of post-conflict violence. Its main objective is to create a coherent reference framework, with which to classify different types of post-conflict violence.

The literature on post-conflict violence suffers of three main, inter-related problems: lack of conceptual clarity, under-theorization, and dearth of reliable, disaggregated empirics. The term 'post-conflict violence' is regularly used with different meanings and to indicate a wide variety of scenarios. There is no generally

[2] I agree with Suhrke (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 6) that 'post-conflict violence' is an oxymoron and therefore the term 'postwar violence' is more appropriate. I follow the established convention, in academia and practice, however, and use the two expressions interchangeably.

agreed-upon definition of the phenomenon. When analyzing it, we aggregate different violent phenomena without distinguishing among their different causal paths. Post-conflict violence also eludes comprehensive theory-building because it takes different forms—domestic violence, public lynching, extrajudicial killings, mob violence, riots, targeted punishments, violent strikes, police brutality, human trafficking, transnational criminal networks, etc.—in different contexts: endemic unemployment fueled warlordism in West Africa; youth violence destabilized Cambodia and East Timor; organized crime and vigilantism weakened democratic institutions in Guatemala and Honduras; armed militias abused former Qadhafi loyalists in Libya (Amnesty International, 2011).

My broader research agenda aims to address all three issues: conceptual clarity, rigorous theorizing, and reliable empirics. In this paper, however, I focus on the first and the second. I define post-conflict violence as "harm directly and purposely inflicted to people during the two years following the official cessation of an armed conflict." I unpack the question of why post-conflict violence emerges by addressing three separate questions: whether violence emerges at all after a war's end, if it does what type of violence it is, and finally why it does so in certain areas, but not in other. In order to systematically analyze these puzzles and make sense of the high level of empirical variability we observe with regards to this phenomenon, I build a typology of post-conflict violence. I do so using the axis: strategic aims and degree of coordination. I identify six ideal types of post-conflict violence accordingly: revolutionary, repressive, revisionist, opportunistic, vengeful, and anarchic.

The paper begins with a clear, working definition of the phenomenon (section I). It then reviews the literature on post-conflict violence (section II) and builds on it

in order to outline a comprehensive theoretical framework to classify different post-conflict scenarios (section III). In section IV and V, it develops a theoretical framework and a typology, respectively, to explain why specific types of post-conflict violence emerge in different scenarios and to show that different types of post-conflict violence follow different logics. The conclusion summarizes the argument, identifies outstanding issues, and indicates future avenues for research.

I. Definition

The first step toward improved conceptual clarity and systematic theorizing is a clear definition of post-conflict violence. Although ultimately an artifice and a convention, only a parsimonious definition allows the comparison of different post-conflict scenarios while capturing their common features in a rigorous and measurable way. In developing such rigorous, working definition, I pay particular attention to allowing comparisons across different fields and disciplines and between academia and practice.

The term 'post-conflict' implies a dual time reference—to the past war and to the period following it. Thus, post-conflict violence has a dual relation—to war and to peace—but does not coincide with either (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, pp. 6–7). This dual nature of the phenomenon has two theoretical and empirical consequences. First, the past wartime dynamics, the war-to-peace transition (or the type of war termination), and the peacetime environment in its immediate aftermath, all have implications on how a post-conflict scenario takes shape, and on whether and which kind of violence will emerge. Second, 'post-conflict' violence has a liminal nature, which eludes a clear demarcation of its boundaries based on the structural dynamics enabling its emergence.

By 'post-conflict violence' the literature and the practice mean a variety of phenomena, including deadly violence, but not only. Existing definitions of 'post-conflict violence' usually have either one or all of the following conceptual components: temporality, types of violence, and vulnerabilities (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 7). My theory of post-conflict violence is based on a minimalistic definition of the phenomenon that includes only the first element—temporality.

I exclude the other two components for similar theoretical reasons: they lead to circular reasoning and limit a priori the possibility of explaining different types of post-conflict violence within the same theoretical framework. In one of the most comprehensive works on the subject, Suhrke (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 6) uses Tilly's definition of 'collective violence' as a starting point to then delve into the analysis of the causes of different types of postwar violence. In this way, a theory of post-conflict violence is immediately circumscribed to a theory of organized, collective violence that assumes a certain threshold of coordination among the perpetrators and only certain types of violent phenomena. We know, however, from the scant empirical records on the subject, that post-conflict violence is often private (domestic violence) and not necessarily organized or coordinated (sexual violence, homicides).

Confining the idea of post-conflict violence to an organized, coordinated, and collective type of violence is problematic also because it presupposes specific causal mechanisms. Similarly, the so-called 'causal' approaches, by focusing on 'vulnerabilities', define postwar violence through markers, such as economic progress and political development, used also to explain its causes (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, pp. 312–319). Thus, any such definition would necessarily be circular. Illuminating and classifying these dynamics is, instead, an empirical task, which goes beyond the

baseline definition of the phenomenon. In sum, definitions based on types of violence and its causes are flawed because they a) exclude a priori a set of phenomena that, instead, emerge often in post-conflict settings, b) make a priori assumptions about the causes and the dynamics that drive the violence in postwar settings.

The alternative, minimalist definitions using an arbitrary cut-off point not only are theoretically sounder, but they are most widely accepted. For example, quantitative studies use usually a 5-year time limit. The UN sets the end of the post-conflict phase at *two years after the official cessation of the hostilities*. Other institutions add the need to include the peaceful and successful conclusion of two rounds of elections that are considered free and fair. This criterion is politically fuzzy, however. Thus, in using temporality as the only dimension to define post-conflict violence, I will rely on the widely accepted and easily comparable, although somewhat arbitrary, UN standard. An intuitive remark supports this choice: the post-conflict period, to be called as such, "cannot last too long" (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 6). Thus, I define post-conflict violence as "harm directly and purposely inflicted to people during the two years following the official cessation of an armed conflict."

II. Literature review

The study of post-conflict violence has the remarkable feature of bridging academia and practice. Yet, the literature dealing specifically with this phenomenon is sparse. Numerous contributions deal with related issues—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants (Annan, Blattman, Mazurana, & Carlson, 2011; Berdal & Ucko, 2009; Duclos, 2012; Muggah, 2005, 2009; Özerdem, 2009; Porto, Alden, & Parsons, 2007; Themner, 2011), militarized politics and elections (Brancati & Snyder, 2011; Dunning, 2011; Lyons, 2005; Paris, 2004;

Sisk, 2008), transitional justice, rule of law, and security sector reforms (SSR) (Arthur, 2011; Kritz, 1995; Mobekk, 2006; Quinn, 2009; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006; Teitel, 2000; United Nations Secretary-General, 2004; Weitekamp & Kerner, 2002; Williams, Nagy, & Elster, 2012), and international intervention strategies for peacebuilding, reconstruction, and statebuilding (Séverine Autesserre, 2010; Berdal, 2009; Chetail, 2009; Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997; Krause, 2005; Muggah, 2009; Paris & Sisk, 2008). This different focus determines that most questions in the literature are not about violence, but rather on how to prevent a relapse into war after an armed conflict, whether certain international interventions are effective, what are the consequences of violence on individuals, communities, and politics (Autesserre, 2010; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004)?

Despite Durkheim, Erasmus, Machiavelli, and Thomas More already inquired whether a link existed between war and relatively violent postwar societies (Archer & Gartner, 1976, p. 937; Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 1), the contributions addressing postwar violence as a subject of study in its own right are still an exception in the social science literature (Archer & Gartner, 1976, 1984; Boyle, 2009, 2010; Herreros, 2011; Smith & Offit, 2010; Suhrke & Berdal, 2012; Zinecker, 2006). Earlier works, and particularly the seminal study of Archer & Gartner (1984), focused on cross-national statistical patterns and measured murders at a high aggregate level. A common feature of recent works is an increased attention to theorization, and a focus on case studies. The latter approach offers a remarkable richness and the ability to explore the dynamics of violence at the micro-level in each case. It does not help, however, to situate each case in a broader universe, which the former approach is more apt to do. Trying to strike a balance between generalizability and attention to causal

mechanisms, I build on existing contributions to create a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains the emergence and variation (of types and distribution) of post-conflict violence.

The empirical literature reflects the prevalent theoretical focus on war-related violence and the discipline's relative neglect of violence that emerges at a war's end (and possibly also the difficulty of collecting sensitive event data in situations of high volatility and institutional and infrastructural vacuum). As a result, post-conflict violence lies at the margin of existing datasets or is dropped altogether because it does not happen within the legal boundaries of an 'armed conflict.' The COW Project focuses on armed conflicts, defined as "a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths per year." The UCDP/PRIO's less stringent definition of "at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year in one of the conflict's dyads" still does not account for violence happening outside an 'armed conflict' (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions).

The UCDP has added new categories of collective violence to its data collection (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/current_projects/human_security/). Particularly, the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset (version 1.4-2012) and the UCDP Geo-referenced Event Dataset, version 1.5-2011), covering the period from 1989 to 2011, measure 'one-sided violence,' a category that aims to record all killing of civilians (the definition excludes extrajudicial killings in government facilities). The UCDP defined as "the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths"—extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded (Sundberg, 2009, p. 3). The second dataset includes the same category, but disaggregated and geo-coded at the village level, and by the day. Although "armed conflicts and one-sided violence do not always

overlap in time," the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset does not provide a full range of violence happening outside a conflict—"one-sided violence and armed conflicts take place during the same calendar year in 87.7% of the cases" (Sundberg, 2009, p. 14). In sum, while such efforts have expanded our understanding of how collective violence threatens human security, existing datasets still focus on violence that happens within countries at war.

Among the existing datasets, the closest to, at least partially, capture the phenomenon of post-conflict violence are the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Homicide Statistics, and the World Bank (WB) Death Rate Dataset. The first contains quantitative data on 15 internationally recognized abuses of human rights for 195 countries from 1981-2009. In particular, it includes data on extrajudicial killings, or killings by government officials without due process of law, including "killings [resulting] from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state [… or] murders by private groups *if* instigated by government (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation). The second covers 'intentional homicide,' defined as "unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person" in 207 countries and territories from 1995 (http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html). The third is part of the World Development Indicators and collects the crude death rate, defined as "the number of deaths per year, per 1,000 population, estimated at midyear," from 1983 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CDRT.IN?page=5).

Alone, these datasets cannot provide the full picture. The CIRI focuses exclusively on a specific, highly institutionalized type of perpetrators; the UNODC

and the WB covers only a particular type of violence, which, although the most easily quantifiable, is by no means the only violence occurring in post-conflict settings; the CIRI, the UNODC, and the WB timeframes that do not correspond to the aftermath of a war. In order to perform a cross-national analysis of post-conflict killings, we need to build a new dataset by combining elements from these available sources. In particular, it is possible to cross the data on extrajudicial killings from CIRI and the data on homicides from UNODC and WB with the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (version 2010-1), which "provides information on specific start- and end-dates for conflict activity and means of termination for each conflict episode" http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/).

Once mapped out the universe of cases of post-conflict violence, it will be possible to analyze each individually and in relation to the others and classify each according to the typology developed in the next two sections.

III. Explaining post-conflict violence

In this section, I begin unpacking the question of why post-conflict violence emerges. Folded in such question are three different issues that existing contributions do not always separate rigorously: does violence emerge after a war's end? If so, what type of violence is it and what forms it takes? And what causal mechanisms drive specific types of violence? In order to improve conceptual clarity around post-conflict violence, this paper proposes a systematic classification of its forms, based on theory-grounded indicators and clearly defined markers. The success of such exercise requires overcoming two sets of issues in the literature. One is theoretical, the other epistemological and methodological, but the two go hand in hand.

Many contributions classify post-conflict violence according to its different types, but authors mean different things by *type*, often confounding in this category the violence's *forms* with its *causes*. But these two features are separate: one is conceptually prior to the other. And clarifying this fundamental, theoretical distinction is necessary to conceptualize post-conflict violence rigorously. The former indicate the repertoires, the scope, and the targets of the violence. The latter pertain to the dynamics driving its occurrence and the variation in its incidence (across and within countries.) I suggest that *type* is a somewhat hybrid category between *forms* and *causes*. Thus, when classifying post-conflict violence we should apply a two-stage analysis. First, identify its different forms, recurrent features and patterns, and classify them according to theoretically grounded ordering principles. Second explore the violence's driving forces within those categories in order to explain its occurrence and variation.

In some of the most insightful and comprehensive works on the subject, Berdal (2009), Boyle (2010), and Suhrke (2012) go in this direction. They identify ideal types, or the recurrent features constraining and encouraging violence in different post-conflict settings. In their analyses, however, the main drivers of the violence remain at a high level of aggregation. But without a theoretically grounded investigation of the causes underlying their ideal types, the comparative implications of their analysis remain limited. In other words, these authors do not investigate the micro-level causal mechanisms that operate within each scenario in spite of the fact that, like most literature on post-conflict violence, their contributions rely heavily on case studies. As a result, their approach fails to take full advantage of the thorough knowledge that in-depth studies generate.

Suhrke (2012, p. 9-10) suggests classifying post-conflict scenarios according to: the nature of the conflict, the outcome of the war, the state's strength at war's end, and the constraints on sovereignty. While these variables would act as enabling conditions, the nature of the violence associated with each scenario should be categorized according to its purpose, target, agent, and means. Similarly, most literature uses three factors to classify post-conflict scenarios (Call, 2007; Chetail, 2009; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008; Fortna, 2004; North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast, 2012; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Toft, 2010a): 1) the type of war just ended and the way it ended; 2) the postwar institutional environment and political regime; and 3) the war legacies—armed groups, war economies, elites' power sharing arrangements, etc.

The first dimension varies according to whether the past war was an internal or an international one, whether external actors intervened in it, and whether the war was settled through a peace agreement or one side defeated the other militarily. The second dimension has to do with how the country emerging from the war looks like, politically and institutionally. The postwar polity can be a new country, due to an annexion or a partition; it can be either fully independent (South Sudan), or operating under the aegis of an international interim administration and therefore only enjoy partial, 'guided sovereignty' (East Timor, Kosovo); it can remain part of the prior political entity if the insurgency fails (Chechnya, Sri Lanka). The new political regime could be different from or a re-instauration of the pre-war one and could lie at any point along the spectrum from democratic to authoritarian. The state apparatus could cease to function, or implode, as result of the war (Iraq), or could continue to be weak as before the war (Afghanistan), or it might emerge relatively unscathed from the armed conflict (Rwanda). The third dimension regards the linkages between the

postwar and the pre-war or the wartime periods. Scholars and practitioners often refer to these dynamics as the 'root-causes' of the conflict—pre-existing conditions that fueled the war but were not solved through it. They also include war-induced, endogenous dynamics, such as patterns of victimization, the development of war economies, new social or combatant networks, the emergence of new power brokers or political elites, etc.

Thinking about post-conflict violence in this way leads to a proliferation of explanatory variables, but does not indicate how to prioritize among them and does not identify which causal paths determine similar or different outcomes. For example, it is possible to think of a significant number of possibilities for each of the above dimensions. Take the first: the war just ended could be a liberation struggle or a secessionist war, the technology of warfare could be regular or irregular, symmetric or asymmetric, an insurgency or a low-intensity conflict centered on sabotage and attacks on property. Which one of these aspects, if any, determines which specific postwar violent scenarios we will observe?

Alternatively, scholars make inferences on the causes of post-conflict violence using a somewhat mirror image of the greed versus grievance framework. In other words, existing explanations focus on either behavioral or structural factors. Briefly, the former emphasize the actors of the violence and their grievances vis a vis the political process, their commitment to peace as a function of economic incentives or their political strategies to attain or maintain power; the latter impute the violence to postwar political regime types, state or institutional fragility, underlying identity-based conflicts, socio-economic imbalances (inequalities, 'rentier states' not founded on a relationship of accountability between political elites and voters).

A sub-set of the behavioral approach is the growing literature on former combatants, which looks at their wartime networks, their links to organized criminality and trafficking networks, and the effectiveness of DDR processes. Tilly's distinction between political entrepreneurs, "whose specialty consists of organizing, linking, dividing, and representing constituencies" and "specialist in deployment of violent means such as soldiers, police, thugs, and gang leaders" is a sophisticated corollary to this approach (Tilly, 2003, pp. 34–35).

I take issue with two aspects of it. First, assuming that the locus of violence's causality lies in the 'former combatant communities' is problematic, even according to the proponents of these explanations, and not necessarily given in all post-conflict situations (Archer & Gartner, 1976, p. 938). According to one of the most recent contributors to this literature, "it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish exactly who is an ex-combatant and who is not" (Themner, 2011, p. 31). My fieldwork research on political violence after the end of WWII in Italy confirmed this concern (Grandi, forthcoming). Second, Tilly (2003, p. 12) is right to argue that violence is political if collective claims drive it. Indeed, implicit in the definition of political violence is that it is organized. Yet, assuming that all post-conflict violence should be explained as 'organized violence' (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012; Themner, 2011, p. 30; Tilly, 2003, p. 40) does not follow logically from that premise. For example, intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence often increase in postwar settings (International Rescue Committee, 2012), but the former is not political and the latter can or cannot be organized. In other words, post-conflict violence is not always political and the degrees of its coordination vary.

Instead, I argue, a more promising way to conceptualize post-conflict violence is to a) identify a set of post-conflict scenarios based on the main political and institutional features of these settings (Suhrke & Berdal, 2012); b) isolate the violence's main drivers; and finally c) explore how the incidence and types of violence vary within each scenario. In this way, I aim to simultaneously account for the variation and the recurring patterns of post-conflict violence across and within different settings. Outlining this theoretical framework is the objective of the next two sections.

IV. Classifying post-conflict violence

My conceptualization of post-conflict violence reconciles its behavioral and structural dimensions, by combining the dynamics connecting wartime and postwar and the motives of the actors. A particularly important insight from the literature is that post-conflict violence has a *dual nature*—or it emerges from the combination of wartime legacies and forward-looking dynamics (Alessandrini, in: Dunnage, 1999; Muggah, 2009; Suhrke & Berdal, 2012). In other words, not only wartime legacies and forward-looking dynamics coexist in producing post-conflict violence, but also the balance between these two components determines different post-conflict scenarios and the violence's variation within them.

As noted above, the literature and especially the practice refer often to the persistence of the root-causes of the conflict. This approach is equivalent to assuming that the same causes drive the violence before, during, and after a war (Grandi, 2012). Certainly, "the inhabitants of post-conflict states are often haunted by the specter of the war long after it has ended" (Boyle, in: Suhrke & Berdal, 2012, p. 111; Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003; Herreros, 2011), but this does not imply that pre-war or

wartime patterns simply persist unchanged and drive post-conflict violence. Instead, the war's end fundamentally changes the incentives and the relative power of different actors. In addition, as many authors rightly argue, how a war ends has important implications for the aftermath. I aim, therefore, to analyze more systematically the idea that a weak state enables the emergence of violence in the aftermath of a war.

My starting point is the end of the armed conflict and the specific incentives that each war termination generates, which, in turn, shape the actor's motivation to use violence. According to how a war ends, three postwar scenarios can emerge, characterized by different political and institutional arrangements, and a different set of incentives and opportunities for political actors to use violence. The scenarios that follow are stylized, ideal types; reality is of course more complex and countries emerging from war can present one or more characteristics defining each scenario.

***Scenario #1*: state weakens**

Since WWII, civil wars have been four times more likely to end in a military solution than in a negotiated settlements; beginning in the 1990s, however, the trend has inverted and more and more contemporary wars have ended in peace agreements (Toft, 2010b). This type of war termination gives raise to political compromise between former enemies through power sharing solutions, to significant institutional weakness, and to the possibility of state capture by specific social or political groups. The state apparatus from before the war is maintained and continues to function, but now new political actors seek leadership positions to establish the legitimacy gained through the war. In sum, the post-conflict political system does not change substantially as result of the war, rather the actors that populate it are more likely to change, and state institutions are likely to remain significantly weak. Even if the

armed conflict results in a regime change or an equally substantial political transition, it does not, however, result in the overhaul of the state apparatus.

In this scenario, incentives to use violence can emerge from a power struggle among political actors, or from competition over the spoils of illegal activities. The opportunity to use violence depends on the actors' organizational capability and on the state's ability to consolidate its capacity and its monopoly over the use of force independently from such power struggle. In sum, violence is a means for the perpetrators to carve a more favorable space for themselves within the polity or national-transnational economic networks in which they aim to prevail. As a result, violence is directed mostly against competitors rather than the state and therefore happens between groups that have, at least in theory, the same access to political power.

***Scenario #2*: state consolidates**

If the incumbent state (or the entity claiming to represent the legitimate state, such as Franco's troops in Spain 1936-1939, for example) wins the war against its challengers, then, at the war's end, the winning state reasserts itself and restores the prior political regime. In other words, the state emerges strengthened from the war and can consolidate its political dominance.

In this scenario, incentives to use violence emerge because outsiders attack the states in order to either sabotage it or overhaul it, or because the state seeks to repress the remaining opposition. As a result, violence is directed from those who hold political power against the outsiders, whom they see as a threat to their newly restored political system, and, vice versa, from those without political power to those who hold it. The opportunity to use violence in this scenario depends on ability of power holders

to identify political opponents and on the political opponents' to organize in sufficient clandestinity to allow for violent action. In sum, violence happens between groups that enjoy asymmetric levels of power.

***Scenario #3*: state collapses**

Finally, a war can end with the decisive military victory of the actors challenging the state. In the most extreme version of this scenario, competing armed groups eventually wipe out the state and plunge the pre-existing polity into a perennial state of instability, short of full-blown war; the result is a failed state (Somalia). More often, the winners bring about the collapse of the old system thereby leaving room for establishing a new one. As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the old state collapses and the winners are the only legitimate political actors tasked with transforming the country emerging from the war into a new polity.

In this scenario, incentives to use violence emerge for two reasons. Throughout the overhauling process the state is too weak to guarantee security and accountability, impunity runs high and the use of violence has high returns and low costs. Alternatively, competition emerges within the winning coalition and political actors seek to consolidate the legitimacy and power gained through the war through the use of violence.

These three scenarios allow us to address the first question (see p. 10) of whether post-conflict violence emerges or not. In each, the violence's type, intensity, and variation depend on the perpetrators' strategic aims (see next section), but whether violence emerges or not depends on the incentives and opportunities that political actors have to use violence. In other words, different types of war terminations usher in different types of postwar regime transitions, in which different

political groups emerge and compete, each with different incentives to use violence. The war's end generates new incentives: regime changes create winners and losers from war settlement, new elites; democratization processes create the need for mass parties and therefore the recruitment of local cadres and the rally of voters. The wartime old organizational capabilities provide the opportunity to act on those incentives. Former combatants retain the organizational capacity to perpetrate violence; wartime political parties the hierarchical control of the center over the periphery.

Thus, whether post-conflict violence emerges or not depends on the combination of how scathed the state emerges from the war and whether there is competition in the post-conflict state among political actors (between winners and losers, new and old elites insider and outsiders of political power). In case this competition exists, then actors will have incentives to use violence. If they will ultimately do, it will depend on whether they will also have the opportunity, in the form of organizational capability, to do so. The table hereafter summarizes this idea.

		Competition	
		Hierarchical	**Horizontal**
War termination	**State weakens**	No	Yes
	State consolidates	Yes	No
	State collapses	No	Yes

V. A typology of post-conflict violence

In this section, I build on the previous theoretical framework to develop a typology of post-conflict violence and address the second question: what type of violence emergence at the war's end? The type of violence that emerge in the immediate aftermath of a war depends on the combination of strategic aims and the

degree of coordination among the political actors who are part of the same cleavage or hold similar grievances.

Violence after a war's end is used either to *consolidate* the situation (repressive), or to *change* it (revolutionary), or to *stir* it in one's favor (revisionist), or to *exploit* it but without intention to change it (opportunistic), or to pursue private settlements (vengeful), or with no specific purpose i.e., at random (anarchic). According to how we answer the question of what the *goals* of the violence are—i.e. what are the strategic aims of its perpetrators—we obtain six possible types of post-conflict violence: repressive, revolutionary, revisionist, opportunistic, vengeful, and anarchic.

The ultimate success or failure of the actors' action does not determine the validity of this classification, as their failure could however usher in a different type of violence. The first caveat, as Boyle (in Suhrke, 2012) suggests, is that these categories are not necessarily stable over time, but can shift from one to another in any given setting. The example of Iraq is pertinent in this respect—anarchy led to violence in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's deposition in 2003, but then the violence became 'revisionist' (Dodge, 2012). The second caveat is that, being these ideal types, more types of violence can occur simultaneously in any given settings. My categorization aims at capturing the more politically salient form of post-conflict violence at any given time and place.

***Type #1*: Revolutionary violence**

The perpetrators of post-conflict violence aim at radically changing the political system and/or the socio-economic fabric of the country emerging from war. This type of violence does not necessary precede a full-fledged revolution. According to Skocpol (1979), a 'social revolution' is both a change in state institutions (a political revolution)

and a change in social structures. My definition is less demanding, but still denotes intent to fundamentally change the rules of the game in a given polity—a transformative intent. Post-WWI Italy or post-WWI Russia are examples of this type of violence.

***Type #2*: Repressive violence**

Violence is used in order to maintain the system, protect it from (real or potential) challengers, and suffocate any opposition. Post-civil war Spain is an example of this type of post-conflict violence.

Type#3: Revisionist violence

Some actors engage in a struggle for power because they do not accept the agreement that ended the war, the war settlement, or some aspects of the new postwar order.[3] Thus, they use violence to manipulate the postwar power distribution so as to favor themselves or their party/allies. This revisionist contestation is political, but can have various objectives: self-defense, leadership competition, normative, etc. (Lawrence, 2010; Themner, 2011). The perpetrators' incentives vary across a wide spectrum. Actors might aim at perpetrating influence and privileges obtained with the war, at establishing primacy over other political actors, at creating a new political or socio-economic identity for themselves or their ally, at maintaining or radicalizing pre-war conflict/patterns of identities and allegiances (i.e., ethnic, religious, ideological), at changing the security environment (how crime is prevented, how culprits are punished), etc. For example, in East Timor, after the Indonesia's withdrawal, resistance veterans used violence to acquire or maintain political privileges. In

[3] The first variation is Stedman's 'spoilers' violence' (1997), in which actors sabotage a peace process threatening their interests.

Cambodia, after the Khmer Rouge regime collapsed, some of its members used violence to maintain their control of areas along the Thai border. Instead, in the post-Dayton former Yugoslavia, after massive population relocations, violence was not used to undo or challenge the ethnic, territorial, and political partition of Bosnia Herzegovina (Berdal, in: Suhkre 2012, p. 76).

***Type#4:* Opportunistic violence**

No change is attempted or envisioned. Rather, actors exploit the system's weaknesses and loopholes and use violence to obtain profit for themselves and/or their allies. The intuition behind this type of violence is most commonly associated with economic incentives (unemployment, low opportunity cost of joining gangs or an insurgency) and opportunities (abundance of lootable natural resources, profitable illegal crops or trafficking). Yet, the perpetrators' objectives can span over a wider array of issues, not strictly economic: from appropriations during privatizations and land reforms, to occupation of houses or territories during resettlements, to administrative, political, or employment positions during purges (assertion of self-status). Examples of this type of violence are DRC and West Africa, where armed actors sought to perpetrate lucrative war economies; the 'maras' controlling drug trafficking networks in Central America.

***Type #5*: Vengeful violence**

A weak security sector apparatus allows for the population to take justice in its own hands. This type of violence is perpetrated to settle private scores and feuds. The weakness of the state enables it, but individual- and community-level dynamics drive it. The weakness of the security sector apparatus can denote not only a lack of state capacity, but also the capture of the state by exclusionary societal groups.

Type #6: Anarchic violence

Violence happens because it can, but without any coherent intent or objective. In a chaotic situation—typically due to a deteriorating security system, where no authority is able to exercise clear control over the population—actors use violence as any other legitimate means to settle disputes or to address their emotions, such as revenge or fear (Petersen, 2002). They choose it over other non-violent means because they deem it more efficient and effective or because they obtain more pleasure from this type of agency (Elisabeth Jean Wood, 2003). Examples of this type of violence are: the looting in Baghdad after US troops deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003; domestic violence, a phenomenon widely recognized as disproportionally affecting post-conflict societies (International Rescue Committee, 2012).

The table hereafter summarizes this typology.

	Degree of coordination/organization			
		Directed cohesiveness	Coordinated fragmentation	None/spontaneous
Strategic aims	Constructive	*revolutionary*	*revisionist*	*vengeful*
	Predatory	*repressive*	*opportunistic*	*anarchic*

Revolutionary and revisionist violence differ because with the former, the perpetrators aim at changing the system, while with the latter, they aim to change their relative position within it. The revisionist and opportunistic types are different because in the former, a limited aspect of the system must change for the actors to benefit from it; in the latter, the system must remain unchanged for the violent actors to be able to profit from it. Opportunistic and anarchic violence differ because while

both are aimed at some sort of return for the perpetrators, the former has a strategic intent, but the latter does not.

We can think of these six types to be on a scale of diminishing ability or willingness of violent actors to affect the system, in which they operate. Put it differently, the relevance of long-term strategic goals as driver of the violence decreases progressively as we move from type #1 to #6. I use two variables, organization and strategic aims and to capture more systematically the variation between different types.

The level of *organization* among the violent actors progressively diminishes from the repressive and revolutionary scenarios, where it is orchestrated and directed, to the revisionist scenario, where it is coordinated among the perpetrators, but does not rely on an overarching, comprehensive chain of command, to the opportunist scenario, where it is issue-specific, namely it coalesces around tactical objectives and dissolves when the objectives are reached, to the vengeful and anarchic scenario, where it is either private or fully spontaneous. Similarly, Tilly (2003, p. 13-15) juxtaposes leaders of centralized organizations guiding followers and drunken sailors scuffling with military police to distinguish different types of 'interpersonal violence' by "the extent of coordination among violence actors." In this indicator I include also the idea that there is a qualitative difference between private and public violence. As Boyle (in Suhrke, 2012, p. 98-99) puts it, 'revenge' and 'reprisal' violence differ because the latter has 'communicative aims' geared toward a public audience.

As we move from one scenario to the other the *relationship between center and periphery* changes too. I use the distinction between center and periphery to denote the distance between the perpetrators of the violence and the locus of decision-making

power. Although I welcome the growing attention placed on former fighters in the literature, I do not equate the tension between wartime political and military actors with the actors' different positioning between center and periphery at the war's end. Political actors are not only at the center, the perpetrators are not necessarily only former fighters, and some actors combine the two identities.

Consequently, in types #1 and #2, the center and the periphery cooperate fully as they share the same strategic goals. In type #3, the relationship is of rebellion or obstruction: the periphery does not share the center's objectives and uses violence to either further its different priorities or obstruct to the center's aims. In type #4, the center and the periphery neither coordinate their intents nor pursue the same goals, but collude, or find a mutually satisfying 'live and let live' (unspoken) agreement, whereby each side pursues its interest and does not thwart the other's. Types #5 and #6 captures the inability of either level to affect the other.[4]

Conclusion

This paper is based on the premise that only a better understanding of what drives post-conflict violence can further our chances of curbing and preventing it (Wood, 2006). Consequently, I aimed to build a theoretically rigorous framework to help us make sense and classify the different, but at the same time recurrent, types and forms of violence after a war's end. I did so by answering two questions separately: does violence emerge at the end of a war? And if so, what type of violence emerges?

[4] As the literature suggests, this classification still leaves out much of the variation we observe in violent post-conflict environments. In particular, within each type, the forms of violence—killings, sexual violence, beatings, torture, incommunicado detention, etc.—its variation—distribution and incidence, or its relation with the territory—and the actors' profiles vary significantly.

My categorization of post-conflict violence begins with mapping the *actors* operating in the political arena. These distinctions will then allow me to translate the macro-level dynamics defining the political regime into the meso- and micro-level incentives and opportunities driving the actors populating the post-conflict political landscape. I showed that violence emerges at the end of a war depending on whether the state collapses, reasserts itself or is weakened at the war's end. These scenarios combined with incentives and opportunities of political actors to use violence determine whether violence emerges or not. In other words, post-conflict violence results from the type of war termination and a combination of new incentives and wartime organizations. I then classified post-conflict violence according to the different strategic aims of its perpetrators and the level of their coordination and obtain six possible ideal types.

This preliminary conceptualization leaves numerous outstanding issues. The first is theoretical and it pertains the third question around the emergence of post-conflict violence (see p. 10): Why does each type of violence happen? In other words, for each type of post-conflict violence, we should explore the causal mechanisms leading to its emergence and variation and ask the following questions about the perpetrators in each context: what do 'center' and 'periphery' indicate? Where are, along that spectrum, the perpetrators of the violence? Is there a political cleavage separating victims and perpetrators? Does the violence happen along the same lines as the conflict just ended or new cleavages emerge? Are the perpetrators the winners or the losers of the war ended with a decisive military victory? Are the perpetrators included or excluded from political power, in case of a negotiated settlement?

The second outstanding issue is the possibility of studying the phenomenon of post-conflict violence cross-nationally. In order to do that, I need to create a dataset and code each post-conflict event (see appendix), according to whether violence ensured and, if so, what type it was.

Appendix

Table with all post-conflict periods post-1945:[5]

Country Name	Year Start	Year End	Post-conflict period
Afghanistan	1978	ongoing	no
Algeria	1962	1963	1964-1965
Algeria	1992	1997	1998-1999
Angola	1975	2002	2003-2004
Argentina	1955	1955	1956-1957
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1988	1994	1995-1996
Bangladesh	1974	1992	1993-1994
Bolivia	1952	1952	1953-1954
Bosnia	1992	1995	1996-1997
Burma	1968	1995	1996-1997
Burundi	1965	1972	1973-1974
Burundi	1988	1988	1989-1990
Burundi	1993	2006	2007-2008
Cambodia	1970	1975	1976-1977
Cambodia	1975	1991	1992-1993
Central African Republic	1996	1997	1998-1999
Chad	1965	1998	1999-2000
Chad	2005	2010	2011-2012
Chechnya	1994	1996	1997-1999
Chechnya	1999	2009	2010-2012
China	1946	1950	1951-1953
China (Tibet)	1950	1959	1960-1962
Colombia	1948	ongoing	no
Congo-Brazzaville	1993	1996	1997-1998

[5] Kalyvas, Stathis & Laia Balcells (2010) International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the Cold War shaped internal conflict. *The American Political Science Review 104(03)*: 415-429; Fearon, James & David Laitin (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Congo-Brazzaville	1998	1999	2000-2002
Congo-Zaire	1960	1965	1966-1968
Congo-Zaire	1967	1967	1968-1970
Congo-Zaire	1977	1978	1979-1981
Congo-Zaire	1996	2006	2007-2009
Costa Rica	1948	1948	1949-1951
Croatia	1991	1995	1996-1998
Cuba	1958	1959	1960-1962
Cyprus	1963	1964	1965-1967
Cyprus	1974	1974	1975-1976
Djibouti	1991	1994	1995-1996
Dominican Republic	1965	1965	1966-1967
El Salvador	1979	1992	1993-1994
Ethiopia	1997	1991	1992-1993
Ethiopia (Eritrea)	1974	1991	1992-1993
Georgia (Abkhazia)	1991	1994	1995-1996
Greece	1944	1949	1950-1951
Guatemala	1954	1954	1955-1956
Guatemala	1966	1996	1997-1998
Guinea-Bissau	1998	1999	2000-2001
Haiti	1991	1996	1997-1998
India	1984	1993	1994-1995
India (Kashmir)	1989	ongoing	no
India (N.East rebels)	1952	ongoing	no
India (Naxalites)	1989	ongoing	no
Indonesia (Darul Islam)	1953	1953	1954-1955
Indonesia (Darul Islam)	1956	1960	1961-1962
Indonesia (East Timor)	1975	1999	2000-2001
Indonesia (GAM Aceh)	1990	2005	2006-2007
Indonesia (Moluccas)	1950	1950	1951-1952
Iran (Kurds)	1979	1993	1994-1995
Iran (Revolution)	1978	1979	1980-1981
Iraq	1959	1959	1960-1961
Iraq	1961	1974	1975-1976
Iraq	2003	2003	2004-2005
Ivory Coast	2002	2007	2008-2009
Jordan	1970	1970	1971-1973
Kenya (independence)	1963	1964	1965-1967
Korea	1948	1953	1954-1956

Laos	1960	1975	1976-1978
Lebanon	1958	1958	1959-1961
Lebanon	1975	1990	1991-1993
Liberia	1989	1996	1997-1999
Liberia	1999	2003	2004-2006
Libya	2011	2011	2012-2013
Malaysia	1948	1959	1960-1962
Mali	1990	1994	1995-1997
Moldova	1991	1992	1993-1995
Morocco/Western Sahara	1975	1988	1989-1991
Mozambique	1976	1995	1996-1998
Myanmar/Burma	1960	ongoing	no
Myanmar/Burma (Communist Insurgency)	1948	ongoing	no
Myanmar/Burma (Karen Rebellion)	1948	ongoing	no
Namibia	1973	1990	1991-1993
Nepal	1996	2006	2007-2009
Nicaragua	1978	1979	1980-1982
Nicaragua	1981	1988	1989-1991
Nigeria	1980	1984	1985-1987
Nigeria (Biafra)	1967	1970	1971-1973
Northern Ireland	1969	1999	2000-2002
Oman (Dhofar Rebellion)	1971	1976	1977-1979
Pakistan	1993	1999	2000-2002
Pakistan (Baluchistan)	1973	1977	1978-1980
Pakistan (Bangladesh)	1971	1971	1972-1974
Papua New Guinea	1988	1998	1999-2001
Paraguay	1947	1947	1948-1950
Peru	1980	1995	1996-1998
Philippines	1950	1952	1953-1955
Philippines	1971	ongoing	no
Philippines (NPA)	1972	1994	1995-1997
Russia (Chechnya)	1994	1996	
Rwanda	1963	1965	1966-1968
Rwanda	1990	1994	1995-1997
Senegal (Casamance)	1989	ongoing	no
Sierra Leone	1991	2002	2003-2004
Somalia	1991	ongoing	no
Somalia	1981	1991	no

South Africa	1983	1994	1995-1996
Sri Lanka	1971	1971	1972-1974
Sri Lanka	1983	2009	2009-2011
Sri Lanka	1987	1989	1989-1990
Sudan	1963	1972	1973-1975
Sudan	1983	2005	2006-2008
Sudan (Darfur)	2003	2011	2012-2013
Tajikistan	1992	1997	1998-2000
Thailand (South unrest)	2004	ongoing	no
Thailand	1967	1985	1986-1988
Turkey	1984	1999	2000-2002
Uganda	1966	1966	1967-1969
Uganda	1978	1979	1980-1982
Uganda	1981	1987	1988-1990
Uganda	1990	2008	2009-2011
USSR (Estonia, Forest brothers)	1944	1945	1946-1948
USSR (Latvia/LTSPA)	1944	1945	1946-1948
USSR (Lithuania/BDPS)	1944	1945	1946-1948
USSR (Ukraine/UPA)	1944	1950	1951-1953
Vietnam	1960	1975	1976-1978
Yemen	1994	1994	1995-1997
Yemen AR	1948	1948	1949-1951
Yemen AR	1962	1969	1970-1972
Yemen PR	1986	1987	1988-1990
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1998	1999	2000-2002
Zimbabwe	1972	1979	1980-1982
Zimbabwe	1983	1987	1988-1990

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